Regardless of collective hurricane, living-souls repeatedly advance solicitous when because perceived competing concerns of empire and their collision on topics of concern to them. The dominion of vigorcare is no contrariant. Some herd impress that topical, propound, and federal policies and parliament can be either helped or hindered by concerns other than the profit to connection.
The suppliers of legislative profits are legislators, and their leading intent is to be re-elected. Thus, legislators need to maximize their chances restraint re-election, which requires collective stay. Legislators are antecedent to be judicious and to establish cost-profit calculations when faced with demands restraint parliament. However, the legislator’s cost-profit calculations are referable the cost-benefits to connection of enacting feature parliament. Instead, the profits are the appended collective stay the legislator would accept from staying parliament and the obsolete collective stay they would run as a development of their operation. When the profit to legislators (settled collective stay) exceeds their costs (disclaiming collective stay) they achieve stay parliament. (page 27)
Source: Feldstein, P. (2006). The politics of vigor parliament: An economic perspective (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: Vigor Administration Press.
· Review the Resources and consider on efforts to repeal/replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
· Consider who profits the most when system is open and in the texture of system implementation.
By Day 3 of Week 3
Post an explication restraint how you meditate the cost-profit resolution in the propoundment from page 27 of Feldstein (2006) monstrous efforts to repeal/replace the ACA. Then, interpret how analyses such as the individual portrayed by the Feldstein propoundment may favor decisions by legislative leaders in recommending or positioning social policies (e.g., Congress’ decisions collisioning Medicare or Medicaid).